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Among the IHllHitNi number of studies §iiaed ot delin-
eating the paranetors of the decision to take risks, relatively
few Utkinso
, 1958$ Utti« t 195*$ Scedcl, iiatoosh, 4 Kims,
1959| Atkinson et al, I960) tew attempted to relate person-
ality variables to risk-taking behavior , Xet, it is roason-
abJ* to assume that motivation contributes as aUch toward
determining the way a person behaves under conditions of
risk as it does in moot other situations. The assumption
seens particularly plausible when one considers the high
variability of individual behavior in risk-tafcinf* People
do net always perfot* so as to make their chances of success
optimal (Hosteller 1 8ogoef 1951$ Bfcitrds, 1953$ 195^$ 1955)
and predictions afc>ut how persons will behave under conditions
of risk which are based solely on consideration of attributes
of the external stimulus conditions lack precision (iSdwards,
1955$ Coombs i i»ruitt f 1940).
The bulk of what has been done in attempting to relate
:r>tlvati-'n to risk-taking behavior has been concerned with
the native to approach success (need achievement) as inferred
t$m content analysis of responses to the McClelland adapta-
tion of the Thematic ^perception test (TAT) (MoClelland et
||| 1953) or to the French Test of Insight (FT!) (French,
1958) e modified apperceptive test. The f reileal model
which served to generate such ef this research has been stated
by Atkinson (1958$ I960)* It predicts that individuals in
2*
who* the MH*t to approach success ie stronger than the
ciotive |B avoid faille will prefer tasks with intermediate
IHPobatoUtlea of success; but that individual* in who© the
native to avoid failure is a trover (inferred fro- low need
achievement) will avoid intermediate risk ana prefer tasks
with very high or very lew probabilities of success. Hi
Plough Atkinson conceives the model as being applicable to
risk-taking situations (gaaea of chance) as well as to those
tasks where skill is required, expert mntal evidence in
regard to the former has been inconclusive*
Seodel* Hatooah <fc Minas had streets <&s) bet on
the outooiae of tossing a pair of dies. "The g$ were zivon
money with which to bet awl told that they might keep the
amount they won* On each of fifty rolls of the dice, the
subject {§) selected a bet tvm nine alternative outcomes with
known objective probabilities but different expected values.
These experimenters <£s) fount? that §p who scored high in
need achievement (as measured by content analysis of responses
to TAT stimuli) selected bets with intermediate probabilities
Significantly raore often than those who scored low in need
achievement* here are, however , several nethodologieal
difficulties in this study* the TAT cards used were not
those best suite-] to evoking aohicvsr-ient-related lnagery*
Apparently the c^pes$8»nters , Cis 1 ) choice of cards was
dictated by an interest in depcafieraoy, press dosinance, and
tEie nature of heterosexual relationships as well as in need
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achievement. A second problem concerns the authors* state-
mm ttot, "in general, the scoring of mm achievement in
ft story fulfilled th© criteria... for Achievement Imagery,
although seise oases of Doubtful Achievement ftftftfy were also
included" <W9» p. 22). It is not clear Just what » in
General" means; nor is the inclusion of the oases of Doubtful
Achlovenent Imagery in any way justified.
Atkinson ©t a (I960) studied the preferences of s
sroup of &s for imaginary bots eqtuted for expected monetary
value but differing in probability of winning in a dice same
where the §fi wore told to "imagine that they were in a
ling situation with friends shouting encouragement while
they rolled a single die11 (I960, p. BU Need achievement
was Measured by the FTI. The preferences of the high need
achievement group showed merely a chance distribution. The
low need achievement group avoided intermediate risk bots
(W6, 3/6, 2/6) and showed a significant preference for
mtrme risk bots (1/6 or 5/6). Thus only the latter group
performed in the manner predicted. In this cfcaoy the range
of probabilities is relatively snail, and the £s placed only
imaginary bets.
In another study, Littlg (1959) had gp roll a pair of
dice ninety-six timoa for each £ five stated probabilities
of success (.10, »30, .50, •70, .90) and found that jgs in
whom need achievonoat was assumed to be stronger (as measured
toy responses to the McClelland adaptation of the TAT)
preferred the night* probability of success rather than the
predicted Intermediate probabilities. However, the oxperi-
B*oter»* Q£*s) data did support the hypothesis that £s in
whom motivation to avoid fa * lure was assumed to be stronger
would avoid intermediate risk* these £s preferred the lowest
probability of success, Llttlg interpreted his results
as indicating that &s who are highly activated to achieve,
discriminate between activities which require skillful per-
formance (where winning is a personal accomplishment) and
games of chance (where it is not). However
, this interpro-
tat ion does not seem to explain data reported by Ward Awards
(1)53) who had &s express their preferences for one of each
of pairs if bets shown to them one at a tima. Using a
specially designed plnbali game as his gambling apparatus,
and three experimental conditions (Just imaglnlne gambling,
gambling for worthless pofeer chips, and gambling for real
money) Edwards found that his gn preferred bets with a .50
probability of winning to those with either a 1/8 or an 8/8
probability. The &s In this study were twelve tiarvard under-
graduates. Although the e*!>erineatar (£) did not measure
need aehievemant, his &s do seem representative of a group
in whom the presence of high neod achievement might readily
be inferred.
The results of the above studies make it apparent that
there is no unequivocal evidence as to whether the need
achievement variable is relevant to explaining behavior In
risk-taking situations. The inconclusiveneas of the data,
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moreover, raises the issue of whether the role of personality
variables in risk-taking might be more profitably studied by
considering motives other then need achievement* stability
coefficients for need achievement are not ver/ loosing
(l/well, 1950, * • #22| Morgan, 1953, * • .C*| Birney, 1959,
* i #29). The subjective scoria system germane to both the
TAT and the FTI contributes to this and detracts from the
value of the tests as research instruments.
The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (2&VS) (Edwards,
195W is an instrument that was seemingly well suited to an
empirical inquiry into the role of personality variables in
risk-taking. It provides a direct measure of 15 "relatively
independent normal personality variables" (19>*4, p. 1)
Including need achievement. Although its need achievement
measure does not correlate well with the TAT measure (Birney,
1959, * • -002, I • 300) its stability coefficient is relatively
high (Edwards, 195S P. 1% * * « • 1509). It has the
additional advantages of a wide range of needs with generally
very high stability coefficients (1 p. 19, * • §jfc to .38,
I I 89) very good normative data (195S P» * 10fW?2)
and an objective scoring syston.
The purpose of this study was to provide data which would
help to clarify the relationship between need states and
betting proforerases and which would Indicate some personality
variables worth extended consideration in attempting to predict
how an individual will behave in a risk-taking situation.
This was to be achieved by using a test which provided a
measure of many needs, an expanded range of probabilities,
beta of several expected values, and real as well as imagery
risk-taking.
METHOD
The apparatus was a nanually operated roulette wheel
eight Ml in diameter, A cardboard template was fitted
ovei? the rotatSn* central disc. The surface of this template
was marked off into eight equal sectors, each of which on-
tained one number, a number frora one through eight. 0:;o of
four projecting armatures an the central spindle of the wheel
was pMM ill and served to Indicate the winning nosbur.
Three sets of eight bets were used, ami all vme stated
with reference to the apparatus. The bets are shown in
Table 1. The expectad value of a bet is the average araount
of money to be won (or lost) by alayin** the bet. Each bet
in the first group has a positive expected value (PUT) of
$C# 52£« Each of the next group of eight bets has a negative
expected value of -*0 # 5&$, The last group consist* of
eight bets, each of which has sero expected value <2BV) (kC.OC).
Each bet at a given expected MM leva! was paired with all
others at the same level, nreducing 28 pairs of bets at each
expected value level. &aoh pair of bets was typed on 3" x T
Table 1
..
> ...t.:vv WMWM
1* If the wheel sto
anything else* y
2. If th© wheel ate
ffvffll on anythin
3. If the wheel 8 to
stope on aqyt****
«r tne wheel
it stops on a
If the wheel
v-r i
n
6* If the wheel stows m
If it ©tops cm anythi
7. If the wheel stops
it ©tope on anyt:iin<*
• Rs^saraioas of Ait nui
on 1 or 7f you win 2.10 # If itlsot yo« win nothing
on 2f *+, or 6, m win iM
. If |1you win nothing*
on 2, h$ 7t ev 8 f you ^n $i #o^. If
•C ol so, you win nothing,
H 2 t 3t 5t 7, or 8, you winhins else, you win nothing,
on anytiling but 3 or 6, you win $0.70*
also, you win nothing;-*
nything bat ?f you win $0.60* Ifl»ej you win nothing*
or t!ie wheel stop© on, you win (MM
v..luff
The sight bets with no.v.lve sacpseto*.' tfttai wes»oijenUcoi with these of positive expected value lie tod
•bow© except that tho verb in each bet wee lose instead
1* If the wheel 3 tope on h9 you win VMft If it stops on
anything sleo, you lose $0*60,
2* If the wheel stops on 1 or 7. you win i 2*10, If it stops
6.70*
i.M). If it
L If
on anytiling else, you loss . .
3« If tho wheel stops on 2, if, or 6, v
stops on aaytiiinc also, you loso
«f* If the tfiool stops on 2, **, 7, or 3, you win
it stops on anything else, you loco i.
If do / steps on 2, 3* 5, 7, or E you win $0.8*f.
If It stops on anything else, you lose ; I. 1* .
6, If the wheel stops on anything but 3 or 6. you win #0,7t.
If it stops on 3 or 6, you lose 2.10*
7* If the wheel stoes on anything but 5, you win : C.60, II
it stops on 5% yon lose ^,20,
0. Hcgr,?»Jloii of what number the wheel stops on* yon neithof
win nor loss*
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paper, and dittoed copies of the entire set of bats were
assembled. The order of presentation of bets wag completely
randoca. £aoh & was given a dittoed copy of tb& total dads
which consisted of 8^ paired bets which were stapled iato
nine separate booklets* Light booklets contained nine pairs
of bets, and one contained twelvo pairs*
MM* »P8 booklets and answer sheets were distributed,
Sa&iecta were aeked to read silently the directions fr m the
cover |J the booklet while £ read gtfsj aloud. Subjects were
requested to return these materials as soon as they had
completed tftcs and to wait for further inatructiona. The
BPPS always preceded the risk-taking tasks* It seemed
advantageous to have these acorea relatively uninfluenced t*y
the oxperiEiental conditions,
tmtimm n&-VMm* When all £0 had cosseted the »>Pe,
the booklets of bets and a specially prepared answer sheet
were distributed, face down, to each £. The experimenter
showed the group the apparatus and read the following
instructions*
Meat of you have probably taken a ohsnce at one
tine or another on the epln of a wheel similar to
this one. The way it usually works is that you bet
on where the yheel will stop. (£ spina wheel.) If
It stops at the number you bet on, you win eose teoney,
or pernapa a prise of aose kind, well, we have no
money or prizes to give away right now, but we would
like you to aske sone bots anyway.
Bach of you has several slips of paper, when you
turn over the top one you will see that it has two
S£&j£^&? ,on it# J*** 1 to oo isirmonto vnie-^ of the bots you would nref«r toma* if you were actually betting m where the wheel
vould stop after I fed |iwn U a sp-. ij^tfthe bet you prefer by encircling the appropriateletter on your answer sheet, ftaoenb<»s yo£ £5choose of each pair of bets* ^iM T tell you to begin, look at the bots on each
slip, sjsJsj your choice, ana then turn the alio overbefore tatfit on to the next on©. Do not look back
at any slip once you have m&e your ©hole©, Work a*quickly as y si ©an, and try not to spend more than
The second soeaion followed the first within a two to fiv«
day interval*
flMWKBflKi Th® «atp«Pieent«r handed out the bets
ana answer sheets and read the following instructions
.
Thia is a study of how oeople behave in a real
gambling situation, fan ircmember that 1 showed
you this wheel the last tim© v© met, and you mac©
©cm© ISMlWiy bets. This tia© you will be bettf:^
for real money. Each of you has a pack of slips in
front of you Ilk* those we used before, Again, each
slip has a mm of bets typed on it, and you are to
indicate whloh on© of the bets you prefer l\, .
Clins the appropriato letter on your answer sheet.
However, this tits©, aft©* you have finished asking
nil your choices, I will spin the wheal for ©aoh
bet and you will win or lose real money, £aoh Urn©
J spin the wheel
,
ay partner will check your bets and
give you your winnings or collect your losses,
w© have finished running off all W bets, anything
that you have won will be yours to keep. If you
lose, you will be paid titty what yen have earned for
participating in the study. Host people manage to
win a respectable amount of money, at least a couple
of dollars, 0c you have any questions T Work as
quickly as you can and do not spent! too much tia©
on any one bet. Go ahead.
Subjects had bean guaranteed a minimum return of H*H
per hour for the time spent participating la the study.
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Outcome® for the actual risk-taking wore not manipulated
caperiaeatallyi they were detercdned by chance.
Imaginary riffc-tateiaf iftawp preceded actual risfc-tsJcingt
tb© order of conditions mm not couaterbalanced. It scened
probable that icaowloag® of results of the strategy eaployed
for actual betting would influence iaa*li*ry betting. It
•eosied Mflttstfy that Imaginary batting would effect actual
betting In the absence of feedbaek*
The £<» |*f| 49 mle 9 under^ra««at« volunteers attending
the University of aaaeaah^atts MM! school. The age range
of Us aaaple was 1? to ad years vita a median age of 20 yoars.
SubJ eo Ib wore run in groups of HgM to twelve for the initial
session (fil'W and inaginary IfjllililiHHg) i For the Racorg
session (actual risk-takto*) group?? of thre* to five &s wer#
rui*.
IMM and MHHl
The results for ¥m (positive e sooted value) bet* ore
presented in Figure 3U figore shews relative preference
as a function of probability of winning with actual versus
Imaginary betting as taw parameter* rhe aeaaura of relative
preference was the nu&ibor of Unas a bat of a given probabil-
ity was ehoaanf naoely, seven times par subject, a relative
profMini of 1.00 would indicate that cadi g chose a par-
ticular fcrt each tine it was offered. Lach point on the
11.
1.00 r
.80
60
£ .40
.20
.00
Actual betting
Imaginary betting
i J
1/8 2/8 3/8 4/8 5/8 6/8 7/8 8/8
PROBABILITY OF WINNING
Figure 1: Preferences as a function of probability of
winning for positive expected value bets.
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1.00 r
.80
.60
5 .40
.20
00
1/8 2/8
Actual betting
Imaginary betting
i 1 1 1
3/8 4/8 5/8 6/8
PROBABILITY OF LOSING
7/8 8/8
Figure 2: Preferences as a function of probability of
losing for negative expected value bets.
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i
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Figure 3: Preferences as a function of probability of
winning for zero expected value bets*
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graph represents the mean percentage of choices for 6) &s.
B >th curves show a positively accelerated upward trend fro»
Ml to U/B, a sharp downward trend to 6/8, and a reversal
upward froa 6/8 to 8/8. The significant features nf this
graph are the peak at V8 and the valley at 6/3.
resets for ICT (negative ejected value) bets are
presented in Figure 2 which shows relative preference as a
function of probability of losing with iftlMil versus iaegin*
ary betting as the paraaetor. Eaea point on the graph repre-
sents the .nean percentage of anolees for 69 B^i* curves
show a downward tread froa 1/3 to **/S, an upward reversal to
6/8, «iai a sharp downward slope to 3/3. Subjects chose the
l/B probability of losing aost ana the 8/8 probability of
losing least. Among the reaaining beta, £s chose the h/B
probability least often and the 6/3 probability aost often.
The results for SMHf (aero ejected value) bets are
presented in Figure 3 which shows relative preference as a
function of probability of winning; with actual versus imag-
inary betting as the parameter. $a«h point on the graph
represents the mean poreonta&e of ch-.-ic^ for 69 £s» fho
graph shows a general IjpMt curve t r n 1/8 to V% a sharp
drop frr,» ?/8 to 6/8, followed ay a alight lacrosse to 7/8 and
a slight decrease to 8/8. The least preferred bat is indicated
bp the 0/8 point on the g*a*h which refers to the lteaf
"Regardless of what number the wheel stops on, you neither win
nor lose," a riskless choice. Of the bets which Involve risk,
&s chose the V8 bet most, and the 6/8 bet least.
• comparison of the thro© figures reveal© that the
difference between imglnary an^ actual better, is negligible?
sublets tend to prefer the saiae beta father or not they can
actually expect to via nor»y, This? finding is supported by
several other stu<Uea# Edwards (1953) found that is tended
to prefer the sane bets whether the gaablinc was togimry f
for worthless chips, or for real Nafta?* Katz Cl?6i) invest!*
S©tod the effects of a number of variables on the decision to
gamble or not to gaable and found littlo differ© -co in whether
£s ployed for WaffMill chips, or chips worth five cents.
Suydsa (1961) found that go reacted very differently to bets
of different elses, being nor© conservative with these of
larger mounts, even though these beta ware only 2MtgS&tsy«
these data suggest that, undar certain eaperlcental conditions,
Hat invest tor whose financial resources are Halted eon
obtain data as pertinent to the problem of risk-taking as
one whose resources permit setting up a monetary gambling
Situation. Furthermore, the data from the present study in
conjunction with that fro© other investigations (Seedel,
Betcosh & Mines, X99)\ Myers, aallly, 4 Taub, 1961; auydasa,
1961) shows that nany £b toot conservatively even whan they
cannot losof i.e., when their own aoney is not involved,
this implies that £s perceive experimental risk-taking as
constituting a Hfe-lifc© gambling situation.
Figures I and- 2 are almost -.r?or Usages of one sjpHalt|
bete which preferred when they HH stated in the "win*1
fmm were avoided «hcn they ware stated as "lose." The hot
16.
which was chosen moot when Its expected value was positive
(VB) was chosen infrequently when its expected value was
negative. Conversely, the 6/8 bot, whioh £e Mfeafl least wtion
its expected value was positive, was highly preferred when
its expected value was negative, the c-ae exception to tfefc
is the 0/8 bet which Is chosen less than night be predicted.
Subject© avoid a certain less relatively mere than they arc
attracted by a MINI win.
4 eomparison ef the graph for the fffl bets (Figure 1)
with t?.iat for the W bets (Figure 3) reveals that preferences
apicnc the latter are less clearly differentiated! as execpli-
fled by a less pronounced pcau at V8. Subjects era Ufalnglf
wore cautious about Uleir preferences v:!iei; nrsy -.ivui bet
involves the possibility of less as well as gain, as is the
case with the W bets.
The ZB? curve dees not shew the upturn characteristic
of Hi |H curve at ttio 8/8 point, UN lit 8/8 bet having
bee c »osen lass than % par cent of the tine it was offered,
this occurred despite the fact that alternatives to the sure
tare payoff involved a possible lose* therefore, it ia
hypotlieaisod Ml either the alternative options to the 8/8
2SV bot have an average positive utility (aubjaotivc value),
or that &e overvalue the probability of winning, or that go
prefer gambling to not gambling, or that aoae MMwM of
these factors operates to lex;or ti» choice of the 8/8 2Xf bet.
The group probability preference data of this iftjlffMnt
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are consistent with those reported by Edwards (1953 j* The
latter, using bets identical la probability end expected
value to those of the present study, but different in having
been stated with reference to a "ri^ed" pinball game, ran 12
individually. There are soiae differences that exist in
the rest
-Its of the two investigations. Curves for the ZEN
bets are flatter, the peak and valley of the flEV curves are
more pronounced, the "mirror" effect manifest between PEV end
WW curves is nore conspicuous, and the degree of similarity
between imaginary and actual risk-taking is niore marked in
the prossnt study than in Edwards
• . Eowover, these differences
are minor, and may be attributable to the snsall, relatively
homogeneous sa.^le used W Edwards, or to differences in ths
Wperlmental conditions! the overall onsistenoy of the
preference pattern found in both studies is urinistakable.
The implications of this pattern are that either &s over*
estimate the probability of winning associated with a %-%
bet and underestimate that associated with a 75-25 bet, or
that tnerc are til fferases in the utility of payoff associated
with the bets. Although probability and payoff are usually
confounded in most real life gambling situations, conceivably
some &s might prefer specific probabilities regardless of what
they paid, or articular payoffs regardless of the probabilities
associated with them. This suggests that there is a need for
fundaments1 measurement it c concerned with determine the
function which relates uti lity and money, and the function
13.
which Elates utility md money, ft* the function vhicfa
relates subjective and objective probability.^ a
sta*t has boon made !n this direction (Hosteller *
195X1 Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel, i>$7) #
t* further implication in earing the present study
with Edwards' is that many more individuals (69 as opposed to
22 &e) ©an be run In a simpler experimental situation (group
as opposed to individual betting) with simpler apparatus
(roulette wheel as opposed to an elaborate plnball ga^) with
little effect on the results.
PsgSttflBUtv Variably JtMlm
Tiie previously used measure of par oent choice does not
readily lend itself to statistical comparisons among the groups
dichotomized on needs. Therefore 9 a measure *r;ioh waiid
permit such comparisons to be made was devised. For PFV bets,
the positive payoff associated with ©ach bet was multiplied by
the number of times & chose the bet* the resultant eight cross-
products were then summed, k ZST naxiauta possible gain (KPO)
score was similarly computed for each A iflSV maximum possl-
ble less iWh) score was obtained by suramins the cross-products
of less and number of choices.
In this experiment, probability was confounded with payoff}
i«e. t there is no way of separating probability frora payoff
preferences. In the interest of conciseness, the following
discussion refers >uly to payoff preferences • It should be
19,
fable 2
* »tM algnifioaat at *05 level (tvo<tallod tost)
• "tM at »10 level (two-tailed test)
borne In mind, however, that the MPQ and MPL ncasuros described
above do reflect probability preforencee. High KPO or MPL
scores Indicate a preference for low probabilities, end con-
versely, o preference for high probabilities la denoted by
low Ml>a or MPL scores.
The figures presented in Table 2 are mean tfPG (for Pi^V
end ZBV beta) and MPL (for «E? beta) scores computed for £s
whose SPPS acorea placed them in the high or lev quartUe of
the diotribution on each need* There yore 17 £* in each
quartlle. The ranges of MPO and MPL acorea aro comparable
for PEV f 28V | and REV bats. After inspecting the data ahown
in Table 2, "t" teats wave done on those differeaoaa which
appeared relatively largo. In the abeenco of prevloag
experimentation there seaned to bo no sound a priori basis
for predicting which of the EPPS needs would discriminate
between high versus low payoff bettors, Since the major
purpose of the study was to provide data which would permit
the generation of testable hypothesea about the relationship
between personality variables and r' sk-taking t rather than to
teat existing hypotheses , treating the results in this way
aooeiod artially Justified, However, because the data was
handled as it was—selecting comparisons to be Bade en an a
posteriori basis—the results which follow Bust be viewed with
caution, and regarded only as tentative evidence to be confirmed
or dlsoonfirmed by gubaeqnont research*
Inspection of Table 2 reveals that fie who scored high
in exhibition (cash) tended to prefer higher payoff bets on PSV
21,
and HP bets. They also risked the possibility of higher loss
on tWJ bets. In contrast, &s low in exhibition tended to play
conservatively regardless of expected value f they chose bets
which yielded wins or losses of seller counts of aoney. For
Mi and ZEV bets, &a high in aggression (agg) behaved like
those high In exhibition, while g0 low In aggression behaved
like those low in exhibition. For UEV bets there was no
apparent difference between £s high or low in aggression. On
PKV bets, £s hign in dominance (do*) behaved like those high
in exhibition (or aggression)} those low la dominance like
those low in exhibition Cor aggression). For zm and HE? bets
there is nc appreclaDlo difference between £s high or low in
Subjects high in autonomy (aut) tended to play C3nserva-
tively. For PE? end ZST bets they chose those with lower pay-
offs, while &s low In autonomy tended to prefer ths higher
payoff bets« For KEY bets, £s high in autonomy risked the
possibility of loci br mounts than tSwse low in auton-
otay. For PE? bets, &g high in endurance (end) tended to pre-
fer lower payoff bets, while those low In endurance tended to
prefer higher payoff bets* There Is no appreciable difference
between &s high or low la endurance for SLT or ~SV bets*
Although the between high versus low achievement
(ach) groups for PS7 bets, and high versus lew abasement (aba)
groups for HEV bete are statistically sigaif icant, the lack ef
22,
any consistent direction to the betting pattern among these §)
suggests that those «t«s" are spurious, and that the relation-
ships are artifactual. There la no observable systasatle
Interaction between high versus low need groups and actual
Versus imaginary betting $ nor Is there any observable system-
atic relationship between high versus lew need group* sac
expected value,
the significant feature of the preceding results is the
finding that three needs showed consistency la one direction,
while two were consistent In the opposite direction. Jn one
hand, &s who scored high In exhibition, or aggression, or
duninanee behaved alike; they tended to prefer the higher
payoff bete. Those who scored low la any of these aseds tended
to prefer the lower payoff bets. On the other hand, &s who
scored hlch in outon ny or endurance platyd conservatively (
they tended to choose lower payoff bets. Those low in either
of these needs tended to prefer the higher payoff bets. High
exhibition, aggression, and dominance scores are contributed
to be Items reflecting needs w.ioh seem to operate primarily in
relation to other persons,1 In one sense they nay be viewed as
1. These needs are defined by Edwards (199*, P* 11) as followsl
j^ttMiifJp £o say witty and clover things, to tell arousing jokes
a rt -.jric-n, to tell about personal adventures and expor fences,
to have others notloe aid comment upon ***** appearance, to say
things Just to see what effect it will have on others, to talk
about personal achievements, to be the center of attention, to
use words that others do not know the meaning of, to ask ques-
tions others cannot answer,
»,g*roasloni To attack contrary points of view, to tall others
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"sets" which predispose the individual to exert control over
events through nanipuletion of interpersonal relations!dps.
Satisfaction of these needs ls contingent upon the reciprocity
of social interaction. In contrast, high autonomy and endur-
ance scores suggest a rather pronounced impersonal or task
orientation. In one sense they may be regarded as predisposi-
tions to influence the course of events by attempting to restrict
the intrusion of others in governing one's relationship to the
impersonal environment* The behavior of other individuals is
much lees important to the satisfaction of these needs than it
what one thinks about them, to criticise others publicly, to
make fun of others, to toll ethers ofiwhen disagreeing with
^J®! t0 revenge for insults, to become angry, to blameothers when things go vronc, to rood newspaper accounts of
Violence*
ftttffilrragg* ?o argue for one's point of view, tc be a leader in
groups to which one belongs, to be regarded by others as a
i-osder, to ho elected or ayptffljM fee irnor >f c: '5ff.v-or>, to
;3al-:o
-roup deeisJ jnsf t settle arguments ml U§ let-con
t t ' ? to persuade end influence others to do what one wants*
tc supervise end direct the eetions of o .ers, to UXL others
how to do their Jobs*
2. These needs are defined by Edwards (199*, p. 11) as follows.
.
u^onoo'/? X'o be able to c---:»e Mil M If < esf red, If MM |Ml MM
thinks sbout things, to be Independent of others in making
decisions, to feel free to do what one wants, to do things that
arc unconventional, to avoid situations where one is exoeeted
to conform , tc do things without regard to what others may
think, to criticise those in positions of authority, to avoid
responsibilities end obligations*
i To keep at a job until it is finished, to complete
undertaken, to work herd at a task, to keep et e
.;>*o or problem until It is solved, to work at a single Job
M^ore taking on others, to stay up late working in order to
got a Job done, to put in long hours of work without distrac-
tion, to stick et e problens oven though it may seen ss if no
progress is being made, to ovoid being interrupted while at
work*
one's mm behavior. H is hypothesised that since Individuals
High In exhibitie% •§gross Ion, or dfinance require feedback
frm other persons la order to evaluate the "success" of their
operational strategy, they would tend to behave In a manner
calculated to draw attention to themselves, in regard to risk-
taking, they would prefer what they perceive as bigger risks,
in hope of eliciting a response from others* However, indiv-
iduals high in autonomy or endurance, bains less concerned
with the admiration of others, and capable of sustained wait*
ing for relatively small gratifications, would tend to ehoosa
what they peroelve as low risk bets with high cumulative value.
Scare additional support for the adequacy of the above
interpretation stems from variance preferewe data collected
from an experimental population similar to that of the present
study.3 subjects to whom the EPPS had been administered, were
asked to indicate their preferences among beta, each having a
probability of occurrence but involving possible wins
or losses of one, two, three, four, five, or six dollars*
For example, £ was asked to Indicate which of the following
bets he would choose If he were gambling on an unbiased
roulette wheel, (a) If the wheel stops on an even number you
win kl.QO. If it stops on an odd number you lose t-l.GC.
(b) if the wheel stops on an odd number you win $6*00. If
It stops on an even number you leas $6.00. The six bets used
3. Fort . Janme Personal corcnunication, August, 1961.
were exhaustively paired with one another, Betting was
imaginary. The EPf»8 n**eds which best discriminated between
high versus low variance preferrers were aggression and auto*
nosy. Subjects high in aggression preferred high variance
bets; those high in autonomy, low variance bets*
Th**e are two drawbacks to using the paired~cos$a2»iaoa
aethod for presenting bets. First, the technique is relatively
insensitive | it gives little indication of an individual's
strength of preference for a particular frt. 4s a resiat, the
data it provide* are difficult to statistically analyse.
~econd, the option is overly clear-cut. Much of projective
test theory is based on the assumption that an individual^
responses to less structured situations tend to reveal acre
about his dynamics than do behaviors in highly structured
contexts* Within certain licits, the mors ambiguous the sit-
uation, the aore need-determined the response, k technique
recently proposed by olovic, Uehtenstela, * Shards (1%1) in
which £ is asked to state the largest amount of money he would
be willing to pay to play a desirable bet, or the smallest
amount he wo Id have to be paid to play an undesirable bet,
has neither of the ab-ve disadvantages. The response x&js^c
appears to be more sensitive to strength of preference than
that of siaple olio ice, and the sitatlon less structured for j*,
tlian is the case with the paired-comparison method. The bid-
ding faethod should therefore result in data better suited to
evaluating the effects of various situational and personality
variables upon risk-taking.
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tm present study suggests the importance of needs for
predieting certain varietiea of risk-taking behavior, loo*
recent studlas suggest that different kinds of personality
variallss Taay also be important. 6codel, ;iatoosh, & Minss
(1959) have reports that *s v!io preferred low-probability-
migh-payoff beta la a dice throwing eacperiment, scored signif-
icantly higher on the Theoretical value of tho Aliport-Varnon-
Lindsoy utudy of Values (Sf) than those who preferred high-
probability-low payoff betts. In another study, Conger et si
(1957) found that automobile drivara with high accident rates
scored higher on the Theoretical value of the SV than titoae
whose accident rates were moderate, or non-existent. These
finding* suggest that drivers with high accident rates way be
similar to high-payoff bettors; both groups are apparently
willing to take high risks. Moreover, these results in eon-
junction with those of tho present study sugsost that at
least two levels of persona 11ty variables—consciously held
alt.: Wles, as well as needs—may Influence certain kinds of
risk-taking. Future research should neglect neither.
CCttfCUiSlJfifiS
In general, it may bo concluded that §fi discrisainata
among beta equal in expected value. Over and above the pattern
of group preferences as a whole, a further breakdown of yt into
sub-groups dichotoraised *i the basis of need strengths produces
betting patterns that diff er among each other, suggesting the
importance of personality variables. In order that predictions
uoo, way* pMMi t^r the rasthod of^
, i*vW(wj,AA^ 0i rcununs! {&) tn»t*© vs»e no
oisnifleant edi^reftea twtmon Jaagiaaay flpjg aetmOl twitting
W is high In j.l>(iliiillg|)| mrm&lcT,t cr dmimneo fcMMl
to prefor bete vith |gg|Woff Ml Xov probability of win-
ftlnst (A) fip hlsh In fl^MMf or o»to**ne# tm&m to p*tli
bote vlth low payoff «aa hl£h probability of mimine.
It %rae octtolud«d that mora dota.1.lod formulation of the
rolo of |HVfiiniiSI||i variables in fft'fliiiiilitT.IM, ma MWMf
conti.rv:#nt upon tothor e^q^rlftontsl lsw»sttgntion»
directions for future tHWW*fcr$n wro 8«(5£OBto&»
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